This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice. The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions.
Introduction
Postwar economics has experienced two revolutions; the first one is the use of experimentation, leading to the birth of experimental economics. The second revolution, closely connected to the first, concerns the fusion with psychology in the domain of individual decision making and game theory, resulting in the birth of behavioral economics. Parallel to the increasing interests in methodological aspects of these exciting developments, however, there seems to be still a good deal of philosophical skepticism toward the very idea of studying human behavior in a scientific manner. There are, the
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skeptic says, some conceptual limits constitutive of the study of human behavior. As methodological interest grows, such fundamental skepticism is receiving less attention from experimentalists (but see Suppes [1985] as an important exception). Perhaps this is a good sign, suggesting how serious experimental studies of human behavior are received these days. Yet the skepticism casts an ominous shadow on the prospect of behavioral and social science; for if the skeptic were right, then no amount of theoretical and empirical work could make a progress in these fields beyond a certain point because of purely conceptual reasons.
1 Thus I would like to take the skeptic challenge seriously, and argue that such shadow is in fact a phantom.
In this article, I will consider two representative skeptical arguments. The first one, which I call the argument from circularity, suggests that the holistic character of belief-desire psychology makes the empirical test of expected utility theory circular, preventing the theory to be genuinely tested. I will argue that this argument fails, because circularity is a problem that can be, and in fact has been, coped with by experimentalists. The second argument, which I call the argument from normativity, suggests that the use of a formal decision theory commits us to interpreting experimental evidence in such a way that the patterns of behavior, belief, and desire are to a large extent rational and consistent with our norms presupposed in the theory. But, (so the argument goes) since there is no empirical way to check whether our norms are objectively correct, a formal theory cannot give a genuine explanation of human behavior. Therefore, behavioral science "is not in competition with any natural science" (Davidson [1995 (Davidson [ ]2004 .
2 I will argue, based on a reconstruction of the history of experimental decision research, that our norms that are implicit in theories of choice are empirically testable and in fact have been tested, and that therefore the argument fails.
The article proceeds as follows: in section 2, the folk-psychological origin of decision theory is outlined. Section 3 reconstructs the argument from circularity, and assesses it. Section 4 reconstructs the argument from normativity, and assesses it. Section 5 concludes.
Nagatsu
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From Folk Psychology to Expected Utility Theory
One of the goals of empirical decision theory is to yield accurate predictions of intentional or purposeful actions. To this end, it is not a reliable method to ask people direct questions about what they believe and what they want. People have various motivations, including motivations to deceive the experimenter, and sometimes even to deceive themselves. Any empirical theory of decision making thus must build on the observation of not only what people say but of what people do. This distrust of people's motivations, however, does not usually go so far as a general skepticism about the fact that people act according to their motivations. 3 An ideal theory would be therefore one that relies on behavioral evidence (including verbal behavior), while maintaining certain psychologically acceptable assumptions regarding the way in which people's behavior is motivated. It is often pointed out (e.g., Rosenberg 1992; that expected utility theory (EUT hereafter)-the standard theory of individual decision making under risk and uncertainty-presupposes folk psychology. In fact, in an article that anticipated von Neumann and Morgenstern's ([1944] 2004) axiomatization of EUT, Frank Ramsey explicitly adopted a folk psychological theory according to which "we act in the way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires, so that a person's actions are completely determined by his desires and opinions" ([1931] 1988,30). Schematically put:
1. We believe that action A is most likely to realize an object O. 2. We desire O. 3. We act in the way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires [folk psychological law]. 4. Therefore, we act A.
Ramsey admitted that the folk psychological scheme "cannot be made adequate to all the facts," but suggested that it provides a good approximation to the truth in the domain of purposeful actions. Although implicit, it is thus possible to say that EUT amounts to quantified folk psychology. In the following, I will sketch how EUT can be used to quantitatively measure people's desires experimentally.
The experimenter offers a subject S a choice of betting or not betting £5 against a certain amount of money (say £25) at various odds. By adjusting the
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odds (p), the experimenter discovers the offer which S would accept 50% of the time. This can be interpreted as meaning that she found the alternative of keeping £5 (outcome b) equal in preference to the prospect consisting of a certain chance (p) of winning £25 (outcome a) and a certain chance (1-p) of losing £5 (outcome c) (this prospect is denoted as [a if p; c if (1-p)]). By finding the odds (p) that result in equality of preference, the relative values (cardinal utilities) of the outcomes to S can thus be inferred. If we conventionally assign 0 to the worst outcome (EU(c) = 0) and 1 to the best outcome (EU(a) = 1), then we can compute the cardinal utility of the outcome b by finding out the odds that result in equality (i.e., EU(b) = p). In a similar fashion one can measure the Expected Utilities of any material demands lying between the best option (a) and the worst (c). Formally, a von Neumann and Morgenstern-type (vNM for short) axiomatization of EUT postulates a set of axioms regarding the preference ordering of prospects (completeness, transitivity, continuity, independence, monotonicity) and derive from them that numbers can be assigned to beliefs and desires (the representation theorem) and that numbers assigned to measure beliefs (subjective probabilities) constitute a ratio scale and the numbers that track desires (utility) constitute an interval scale (the uniqueness theorem). 4 In terms of measurement, it is crucial that the axiomatization is achieved. The merit of the first theorem is evident: if we want to accurately measure the agent's beliefs and desires, it is useful to assign numbers to them. The merit of the second theorem is to guarantee that we can do so as uniquely or nonarbitrarily as possible. To appreciate this point, consider different degrees of uniqueness in assigning numbers in measurement in general. Table 1 shows four different degrees of measurement, in order of descending strength.
5
Which scale to use depends on at least two kinds of considerations, first, the purpose of a particular measurement, and second, the theoretical feasibility. For example, if all we want is to rank the world top 100 universities, an ordinal scale (4) should suffice, and there is no need to worry about whether we can say that the 22nd university is as much better than the 32nd university as the 64th university is than the 74th, even if we could. On the other hand, it is essential for our everyday life that the time difference between 2p.m. and 4p.m. is the same as that between 6p.m. and 8p.m. (scale type 3), although it is difficult and unnecessary to think of an absolute zero in this time scale Nagatsu 269 (When did time begin?). The vNM-type uniqueness theorem enables us to measure degrees of beliefs in a ratio scale (2), and degrees of desires in an interval scale (3). The accuracy of the measurement is improved, not merely because numbers are assigned by the representation theorem, but because the ways in which the utility scale is defined and connected to the observations are logically airtight as per the uniqueness theorem. This surely constitutes progress in measurement, given that we consider the same kind of purely mathematical achievements in natural science progressive. In fact, even in physics it is not a trivial task to define an unambiguous measurement procedure in a mathematically precise manner: as von Neumann and Morgenstern ([1944] 2004, 3) observed, " [t] he precise measurements of the quantity and quality of heat (energy and temperature) were the outcome and not the antecedents of the mathematical theory." 6 Despite this progress in measurement, some criticize EUT for its dependence on folk psychology. In the following, I shall discuss two main arguments in turn.
The Argument from Circularity
A representative presentation of the argument from circularity can be found in Rosenberg (1992) . In referring to the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Rosenberg says:
[T]he Von Neumann-Morgenstern approach does not provide independent methods of "holding constant" preferences or beliefs. In order to infer beliefs from choices, we must use the theory of expected utility to calculate preferences beforehand. In order to determine preferences Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes (1955, 151) .
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from choices, we need to use the theory of expected utility to calculate the strength of beliefs beforehand. So there is no way to test the hypothesis that individuals are expectations-constrained, expected-utility maximizers, because we need the hypothesis to determine the expected utilities the hypothesis predicts they will maximize and to determine the expectations that constrain their maximization (1992, 123) .
The argument seems to be this: 7 1. Since beliefs (B) and preferences (P) are not directly observable mental states, we must, in testing EUT, infer these variables from an agent's action or choice behavior (C), which is directly observable. 2. For this inference, we must depend on EUT, which has the following form: C = f(B,P). 3. To measure the value of either B or P from C, we need to fix that of the other variable in advance. 4. For that, we need to use the form C = f(B,P), the very theory we are trying to test. 5. Therefore, EUT is empirically untestable.
To be clear about what the real issue is, I will first discuss a related but distinct problem of indeterminacy, and then turn to the problem of circularity, the main target of Rosenberg's argument. In premise 3 and 4, Rosenberg alludes to the well-known problem of the holism of the mental, according to which propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires are conceptually so interdependent that these attitudes must be simultaneously assigned to an agent as a set.
8 Correspondingly, EUT presupposes that an agent has different preferences over consequences to measure her degree of beliefs, and vice versa. How does EUT manage to measure beliefs and preferences "one at a time," holding constant the other variable? In a passage immediately preceding the paragraph cited above, Rosenberg points out that vNM measurement Nagatsu 271 does not provide any method of doing this, thus creating a problem of indeterminacy. Consider the vNM measurement of Expected Utility illustrated in the previous section. The problem of indeterminacy arises when implementing this measurement experimentally, i.e., it leaves room for some alternative interpretations of the data.
9 First, it may be the case that the subject evaluated the alternatives solely based on their values, but it may equally be possible that she evaluated the alternatives based on some nonneutral attitude toward the risks or the uncertainties involved: if she is risk averse, a high odds of losing £5 will discourage her to choose that alternative, just like a lower utility score discourages the choice; if she is risk taking, the same odds will encourage her to choose that alternative, just like a higher utility score encourages that choice.
10 As long as the experimenter cannot separate these two effects, he cannot measure the cardinal utilities of the alternative outcomes a, b, and c to the subject.
The measurement of subjective probability also suffers from the problem of multiple interpretation. In the above case we presupposed that the adjustment of the odds will be directly reflected in S's subjective probabilities. That is, if the odds are 1/3, for instance, this is supposed to invoke the same subjective probability 1/3 to her mind. Doubting this may seem unsoundly skeptical, but not necessarily so. Suppose the experimenter has changed the odds (p) from 1/13 to 1/12, and S moved from preferring keeping £5 (b) to the prospect [£25, 1/13; -£5, 12/13], toward being indifferent between b and the new prospect [£25, 1/12; -£5, 11/12]. The chance of winning £25 (a) increased by about 0.0064%, so it is possible to interpret that S became indifferent between the two options, increasing the confidence in obtaining £25 by 0.0064%. However, it may well be that she took the change of the denominator of the odds as a good omen (e.g., because she superstitiously dislikes number 13), and overestimated the increase of the chance of winning £25 as, say, 1%. This may sound apparently "irrational," but it is a possibility and cannot be excluded prior to empirical investigation. Thus we cannot simply identify the subjective probabilities with the mathematical (i.e., objective) probabilities; subjective probabilities need to be measured experimentally. But to do this, 9 The example is based on an illustration of Mosteller and Nogee's (1951) experiment in Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes (1955) . 10 Of course, an Expected Utility curve is interpreted as manifesting the subject's "attitude toward risk" (risk-neutral if the curve is linear, etc.). However, this presupposes that the subject has a linear "decision weight" function that mirrors the objective probability-an untested empirical assumption.
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we need to measure cardinal utilities, whose measurement also has the problem of indeterminacy as described in the previous paragraph.
The solution to the problem of indeterminacy can be found in Ramsey's ([1931] 1988) seminal article, which was written more than 20 years before vNM's axiomatization.
11 According to Ramsey, an individual i is said to be "ethically neutral" toward a proposition e if and only if (1) i believes that e is true with probability 1/2; and (2) i is indifferent between two states of affairs that differ only in whether e is true or false. (In what follows I will talk about an ethically neutral state E in which e is true, instead of e.) A plausible example of an ethically neutral state is one in which a toss of a fair coin yields heads. With this assumption in hand, we can first measure i's subjective expected utilities of prospects, and then measure i's subjective probabilities for events in the following way: (1) (3) Once any option can be given a utility, you can measure i's subjective 11 Although usually Savage (1954) is credited as a "synthesis of the works of Bruno de Finetti on a personalistic view of probability and of the modern theory of utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern" (Luce and Raiffa 1957, 300) , I refer to Ramsey here because my focus is not the theoretical synthesis but the separate measurability of beliefs and desires, which is already suggested by Ramsey.
The following exposition draws on Anand (1993, 7-10) and Pettit ([1991 Pettit ([ ] 2002 . 12 The utility for an item aa which is beyond the scale between a and c can also be calculated by finding an item (l) in the scale such that i is indifferent between prospect [aa if E*; l if ¬E*] and a. Similarly for an item which is below the scale. See Pettit ([1991] 2002, 219) . probabilities for states other than E*. If you want to know i's belief about the likelihood of some state S, for instance, first obtain the utilities of the prospect K = [x if S; y if ¬S] and its component options x and y, and denote these as u 3 , u 1 , and u 2 , respectively. The utility of K is given by u 3 = pu 1 + (1-p) u 2 , where p is i's degree of belief that S will occur. Rearranging this equation, you get i's subjective probability p = (u 3 -u 2 )(u 1 -u 2 ), the ratio of two utility differences.
Notice how much is achieved based on a relatively austere assumption that i has a preference ordering over options. This preference ordering makes it possible to identify an ethically neutral state, which in turns serves to determine in principle the entire expected utilities and subjective probabilities for i. Since the ethically neutral state is fixed throughout the procedure, it is possible to measure first expected utilities, and then subjective probabilities. The Ramsey method was rediscovered by Donald Davidson, who was working as a member of Stanford Value Theory Project in the mid 1950s, leading to a separate experimental measurement of expected utilities and subjective probabilities "one at a time."
13 More recently, Kahneman ([1992] 2000) have followed a similar procedure, measuring subjective attitudes toward risk ("decision-weighting functions") while holding utility measurement constant.
The upshot is that the problem of indeterminacy was solved, although Rosenberg is apparently unaware of this fact, mixing up the vNM measurement and the Ramsey method: "[i]t is ironical that the impetus of [the holism] thesis is to be found in the same work of Frank Ramsey to which so much of the economic theory of choice under uncertainty is beholden" (Rosenberg 1992, 157-58) . Not ironical at all; for not only did Ramsey base his theory on the holism of the mental, but also he provided a method of measuring expected utilities and subjective probabilities separately. The indeterminacy arising from the holism of the mental is not an obstacle peculiar to the study of the mental, but just an example of difficulties that any experimental scientists must face. 14 So much for indeterminacy. Now let us turn to what I take to be the main problem of the argument from circularity. To put it simply, the problem is that 13 Davidson (1974 Davidson ( [2001 ) himself provides a rough sketch of his version of this method. See Suppes and Winet (1955) and the references therein for more detail. 14 In fact, considering the fact that it took almost 250 years to have a reliable measuring method of temperature after Galileo and others' first use of thermometers at the end of the sixteenth century (Chang 2004, xvii) , the progress of the measurement of utility in the last 50 years should look rather impressive.
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it is based on a hidden but false assumption, making in effect the argument a non sequitur. The implicit assumption concerns in general the theory-ladenness of observation, which has been much discussed by philosophers of science (e.g., Hanson 1958; Kuhn 1962 ), but in particular its relation to theory testing: the assumption is that the hypothesis in question cannot be tested by an observation that is itself interpreted by using that hypothesis. At first sight this assumption appears plausible; the test of a theory by observations that rely on the same theory seems to vacuously confirm that theory, hence not constituting a genuine test. Although intuitively appealing, this assumption is false. In fact, in empirical science it is not uncommon that theory-laden observations disconfirm the very theory presupposed. For example, in physical geometry, even if Euclidean geometry is stipulated in the physical laws used to compute the correctness for distortions in measuring rods, this does not guarantee that the geometry obtained by the corrected rods will be Euclidean (Grünbaum 1960, 82) . Another example comes from astronomy. Although superluminal velocities (i.e., objects moving faster than light) are impossible in Einstein's relativistic physics, it has been observed that the relative velocity between two celestial bodies is superluminal in some cases, despite the fact that their relativity-based recession velocity is used to calculate the relative velocity (Brown 1993, 555-57) . These examples show that a theory-laden observation can disconfirm the theory, or that the theory is "F-B disconfirmable" by a F-B test.
15
In turn, if a particular hypothesis is F-B disconfirmable, it seems reasonable to think that that hypothesis could be confirmed should it pass a F-B test by yielding accurate predictions. For if the observation of O makes the probability of a hypothesis H being true given the background knowledge B lower than the probability of H given B only, then the observation of ¬O should make the probability of H given B higher than the probability of H given B only. 16 One may call such hypothesis testing "circular" but not viciously so.
17
Nagatsu 275 Having seen that the implicit assumption that theory-laden observations cannot test the theory does not generally hold, the next question is whether our case of interest, expected utility theory, is F-B (dis)confirmable. In the following I will show that it is, by giving an example of anomalous phenomena called preference reversals (PR). PR was first observed by experimental psychologists Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Lindman (1971) , and came to be widely known (and believed to be a genuine phenomenon) among economists after Grether and Plott's (1979) article. The phenomenon emerges in trying to infer people's preferences over a pair of gambles of comparable expected value by using two kinds of tasks. 18 One gamble (the H bet) offers a high probability of winning a modest sum of money; the other gamble (the L bet) offers a low probability of winning a relatively large amount of money. So for example:
H bet: 28/36 chance to win $10 L bet: 3/36 chance to win $100
When offered a choice between the two options H and L, most subjects choose the H bet over the L bet. However, when asked to state their minimum selling price, the majority state a higher price for the L bet than for the H bet. That is:
where " ≻" denotes a strict preference relation, ">" a strict ordering of cash amounts, and C L and C H are the minimum selling prices (cash equivalents) of the L bet and H bet, respectively. According to EUT, (1) and (2) together (assuming more money is better than less) imply:
where "≈" denotes an indifference relation. Since (3) apparently violates the transitivity of preference orderings (i.e., it manifests "C H ≻ C L " and its reverse 276
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at the same time), PR constitutes a serious anomaly to EUT, which, like most formal theories of rational choice, presupposes that preference orderings are "well-behaved" and stable. The observation of PR is theory-laden in the sense that these presuppositions are stipulated in eliciting preference ordering from behavior (choice and pricing). And yet the circularity involved does not vacuously confirm the theory under test, as the observation is anomalous and therefore can potentially disconfirm the theory. This nonvicious circularity derives from the fact that, in experimental context, preference-a theoretical construct of EUT-is not purely theoretical, but partly empirical because to be measured it needs to be given some interpretation through the use of at least one elicitation procedure. Once bridged to the world in this way, even such a theory-laden construct as preference can be measured, and tested with different elicitation procedures (more on this point in the next section).
It is a nontrivial question whether PR or some other anomaly, or a conjunction of various anomalies-there are many-has definitively disconfirmed EUT, just like whether the above-mentioned counter-example has definitively refuted Einstein's relativistic theory. But the important point here is to notice that EUT is disconfirmable: the EUT-based observation creates an anomaly for EUT. The upshot is that although the premises (1-4) in the argument from circularity are true, its conclusion (5) does not follow from these because its hidden assumption is false in general, and in particular in the case of EUT.
The Argument from Normativity
Another skeptical argument against the progress of behavioral science can be found in several works of Donald Davidson, who, as we saw, introduced the Ramsey's method to the postwar experimental study of individual decision making under risk. This success in his early career, however, did not convince him of the scientific respectability of behavioral science; quite the contrary, through this experience as an experimental psychologist, Davidson turned into a prominent skeptic concerning the possibility of the scientific study of human behavior in general (cf. Davidson [1974] 2001). Davidson's argument is notoriously complicated, presupposing various theses developed in his work on the philosophy of mind, action, and language. Rather than reconstructing his argument comprehensively, I will try to extract what I think is directly relevant to the possibility of the progress of behavioral Nagatsu 277 science, based on some of his key articles ([1974] 2001; 1985; [1995] 2004).
19
The essence of Davidson's argument, which I call the argument from normativity, is this:
1. To measure people's beliefs and desires experimentally, we must use a formal theory, such as Ramsey-type decision theory.
20
2. But the use of a formal theory commits us to interpreting experimental evidence in such a way that the patterns of behavior, belief, and desire are to a large extent rational and consistent with our norms presupposed in the theory. 3. There is no empirical way to check whether such norms are objectively correct. 4. Therefore, belief-desire psychology, however exactly it is formulated, cannot provide a bona fide empirical explanation of human behavior.
I shall argue that premise 3 is false, and because of this, the conclusion (4) does not follow. I will substantiate my argument by using the already introduced example (preference reversals) from a history of experimental economics, but before doing so, let me hasten to add that Davidson is not a straw man; on the contrary, his position is sophisticated enough to be seriously discussed in the methodology of experimental psychology and economics. To convince the reader of this point, I shall comment on each premise in turn.
19 Evnine (1991) 
278
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40(2)
Premise 1 is unproblematic; the formalization of decision theory constitutes theoretical progress, which is necessary to improve the accuracy of the measurement of beliefs and desires, as I have argued in section 2. Premise 2 is the key claim, which concerns the so-called principle of charity that we must use in interpreting a speaker's meanings in a "radical" situation where we have no background knowledge regarding the speaker's language (expect that it is a language). In other words, our interpretation must be based solely on the speaker's "verbal behavior." Quine (1960, chap. 2) claimed that the radical interpretation is possible only on the presumption that the speaker shares most of our linguistic meanings such as those of logical connectives ("and," "or," "if," etc.), i.e., that he is to a large extent rational in the same way as we are. Davidson is arguing that the situation is analogous in the behavioral experiment, where we must use decision theory to measure an individual's beliefs and desires based on the evidence regarding her choice behavior. Here is a key quote:
[T]he formal theory (as opposed to features of its empirical application) says nothing at all about inconsistencies. It not only postulates perfect logic and a consistent and rational pattern of beliefs and desires, but it assumes rationality in the treatment of what we take to be evidence. Inconsistencies and failures of reasoning power must be accommodated by injecting large doses of what has been called charity in the fitting of the theory to actual agents. . . . The formal theory leaves no room for irrationality, and therefore is powerless to explain it. (Davidson [1995 (Davidson [ ] 2004 First, notice that Davidson is not suggesting that we are never able to find inconsistencies. 21 Just like the interpreter can sometimes reasonably conclude that a speaker is mistaken in his speech, 22 the experimenter can sometimes reasonably attribute inconsistencies to his subjects. What Davidson is suggesting is rather that the formal theory is committed to explaining such inconsistencies within the framework of the theory, and that such explanations will be dictated by the norms implicit in the theory. Note, secondly, that this claim is surprisingly consistent with what has actually happened in the experimental studies of EUT. Experimental economists, facing the anomalous phenomenon of preference reversals (PR; see the previous section), Nagatsu 279 tried to modify EUT in such a way that the fundamental norm of formal rational choice theory is retained. Economists have proposed many ways to modify EUT to accommodate PR and other anomalies; most of the alternative theories proposed by economists modify or weaken one (or more) of the axioms of EUT, but in such a way that the formal achievements of EUT (the representation theorem and the uniqueness theorem) can be maintained. In other words, economists insist that the subjects' choice behavior be seen as a maximization of some sort of utility functions, if not of an Expected Utility function. Two major attempts along this line illustrate my point:
23 first, some economists questioned the elicitation procedure of minimal selling prices. One way of measuring the minimal selling price of a bet is just to ask the subject, "If you were selling the bet, how much would your minimum price be?" Economists, however, prefer another method called the BDM method, named after its inventors Becker, DeGroot, and Marschack (1964) . 24 This elicitation scheme begins by asking a subject the minimal selling price of a bet; then an offer (of buying) is generated by a random process: if the offer is higher than her selling price, the subject gets the price; if it is lower, then she has to play the bet. This is called an "incentive-compatible" scheme because an incentive to tell a price that reflects one's true preference is built in by forcing the subject to act on the stated price when the chance to do so arrives. It has been pointed out that this procedure presupposes the independence axiom of EUT, and that if it is dropped then the stated price of a bet is no longer equal to its cash equivalent (Holt 1986; Karni and Safra 1987) . 25 A few years earlier, Mark Machina (1982) had proposed a generalized expected 23 Arguably, prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is the most ambitious and successful attempt to modify EUT, but for two reasons I shall not discuss it in this article; first, its features are rather heterogeneous, mixing the conventional and nonconventional approaches (see below). Second, and more importantly, it has not been proposed as an explanation of PR, my main example in this article. Kahneman and Tversky propose another theory to account for PR, as we will see below. 24 See Guala (2000a) for a detailed discussion of the BDM mechanism and its relation to preference reversals. 25 Segal (1988) pointed out the possibility of the violation of the reduction axiom, according to which it is possible to reduce a two-stage lottery to the equivalent onestage lottery. Ironically, however, if subjects violate both the independence axiom and the reduction axiom, then the BDM procedure ensures that the result properly reveal the subjects' preferences (see Carmer 1995, 657, 659) . Since the antecedent seems to hold, PR cannot be explained by the use of BDM.
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utility model which weakens the independence axiom. However, Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) demonstrated that the frequency of PR was not lower in the experiments without an incentive-compatible scheme like BDM (see e.g., Lichtenstein and Slovic [1971] ) than in those with the BDM. Thus they concluded that PR cannot be explained by the violation of the independence axiom. To make this point stronger, Tversky et al. designed explicitly an incentive-compatible elicitation method without the elicitation of actual selling prices at all: the idea is that, to demonstrate PR, it is sufficient to know the subjects' ordering of the bets, without knowing how they actually price the bets. In this way one can explicitly avoid using methods that presuppose the independence axiom. With this design, they observed again systematic reversals, which establishes that PR cannot be explained as the violation of the independence axiom.
26
A second attempt to account for PR while maintaining the formal structure of the theory is so-called regret theory proposed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) . Essentially, regret theory redefines the outcomes that are the objects of choice. Giving up the consequentialist framework, according to which only the actual outcomes should matter to people, Loomes and Sugden proposed to explicitly incorporate into the theory the psychological intuition that people may evaluate consequences in comparison with a counterfactual scenario. For example, consider a simple case of choice between two bets B1 and B2 (see table 2 ).
If a subject chooses B1, and S2 obtains, she would experience a psychological displeasure ("regret"), because she knows that she would have got £10 had she chosen B2. Similarly, if the subject chooses B2 and S2 obtains, she would experience a psychological pleasure ("rejoicing"), because she knows that she would have got nothing had she chosen B1. By the same token, the psychological experiences will be rejoicing and regret for B1 and B2 respectively, if S1 obtains. (It is assumed that there is neither regret nor rejoicing if S3 obtains, because under this state choosing B1 or B2 gives the same outcome, £0.) So what matters for the subject is not just the consequence she ends up with, but both the consequence and the counterfactual ("what could have been had I chosen differently"). Formally, the individual chooses between actions so as to maximize the following expected modified Nagatsu 281 utility function of action A i , evaluated with respect to action A k at the jth state of the world (among n states):
where c (the abbreviation of C(.)) is a choiceless utility function which assigns a real-valued index to every conceivable consequence, whether or not it is the result of one's choice, and R(.) is a regret-rejoice function which assigns a real-valued index to every possible increment or decrement of choiceless utility. Loomes and Sugden (1983) argued that Grether and Plott's (1979) observations of PR could be predicted by regret theory if C(.) was assumed to be linear, in addition to some other restrictions on E k i . Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) in contrast argue that it is not the major cause of PR. Camerer (1995, 660) , based on somewhat varying evidence indicating the relative importance of intransitivity (10% according to Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman [1990] and Cox and Grether [1991] ; 20-25% according to Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden [1991] and Loomes and Taylor [1992] ), concludes that the violation of transitivity partly explains PR.
Notice that although regret theory explains PR as a failure of transitivity, it still maintains that people's choices are rational in the sense of the modified expected utility maximization. That is, since the value of choosing an action depends on the nature and combination of the actions simultaneously rejected (because of regrets and rejoices associated with the comparison), giving up the transitivity axiom of EUT renders people's choice behavior neither normatively questionable nor difficult to make sense of (Loomes and Sugden 1982) . Such normative defense of regret theory seems to confirm Davidson's claim that any formal theory of rational choice "assumes rationality in the treatment of what we take to be evidence." Guala (2000b) , in line with this interpretation, points out that the weaker (stronger) normative plausibility of an axiom of EUT encouraged (discouraged) economists to abandon that 282
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axiom in modifying EUT in the face of anomalous empirical evidence.
27
Based on premise 2, which by now should appear rather plausible, Davidson goes on to argue that, since there is no empirical way to check whether such a normative way of dodging counter-evidence leads us objectively to a better theory (premise 3), a formal theory cannot give a genuine, naturalistic explanation of human behavior (4). Having motivated the discussion of Davidson's argument, I shall now turn to the critical mode and try to give reasons to reject premise 3 and accordingly the conclusion of the argument from normativity.
Davidson does not precisely characterize the concept of normativity, but I propose, based on the reconstruction of his argument, that it boils down to the fact that certain notions (e.g., that people are rational in the sense of some formal theory) are presupposed in the testing of these very notions. This does not, however, imply that such notions are empirically untestable, as I have argued in section 3; as Davidson admits, inconsistencies can be (and in fact have been) observed in testing EUT in empirical contexts, that is, EUT was F-B disconfirmed, despite the fact that some normative concepts were presupposed in the theory. And empirical evidence such as PR convinced economists to abandon some normative concepts (expressed as axioms). So while this does not guarantee that a modified theory is closer to the true theory, it does suggest that at least the modified theory is empirically more satisfactory than the original EUT. Since we have no general account of what guarantees the truth of a scientific theory (including what it means for a theory to be true), the fact that normative considerations worked as a heuristic for modifying EUT is insufficient to refute its objectivity. Unfortunately, however, economists have continuously failed to find a (rational) theory to accommodate anomalies such as PR. Although this fact seems to confirm the conclusion (an inability of rational choice theory to explain human behavior), this is not because of the analytic truth of premise 3; it is simply because of 27 The independence axiom is normatively weaker than the transitivity axiom, hence the historical order of their abandonment. While Guala (2000b) rationally reconstructs the history of decision theory as a history of "normative falsification," Starmer (2000) criticizes economists' tendency to be influenced by normative considerations, and argues that any empirically plausible theory should explicitly model the psychological processes that result in choice (nonconventional, or "procedural" approaches, as opposed to conventional, or "as if" approaches). Although Starmer categorizes regret theory as a nonconventional approach since it is based on some intuition about actual human psychology, Wilkinson (2007) for example categorizes it as a conventional approach since it retains a commitment to representing people's behavior as utility maximization. Based on these considerations, it may be possible to characterize regret theory as a transitory approach between the two. the contingent fact that any formal theory of rational choice has not accounted for all the evidence so far.
More importantly, a plausible nonrational explanation of PR is available. Remember that PR is observed in inferring people's preferences over pairwise choices using a two-task method, e.g., asking the subjects to choose between H bets and L bets, and eliciting their minimal selling price for each. This method should yield the same preference orderings if preferences over prospects are independent of the method used to elicit them. It has long been pointed out that this principle, known as procedure invariance, does not hold empirically. In contrast to most economists who try to accommodate the data of PR by the normative adjustment of EUT, experimental psychologists have been claiming that PR can be explained by the violation of procedure invariance (more specifically, overpricing of L bets over H bets, relative to the choice task) (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990) . Their explanation is called the "compatibility hypothesis," stating that different elicitation tasks evoke different responses from people either because some information stimuli are more compatible with certain response modes than with others because of the associated computational costs (e.g., the dollar-dimension is more compatible with pricing [in dollar] tasks than choice tasks), or because some tasks evoke certain decision strategies rather than others (e.g., choice tasks evoke qualitative decision strategies such as elimination by aspects, lexicographic orderings, while pricing tasks evoke quantitative strategies such as anchoring and adjustment), or because of both reasons.
28
It is crucial to notice that procedure invariance is not a normative principle peculiar to the measurement of beliefs and desires, but a general empirical presumption found in any empirical measurement. Consider as an example the assumption that a pan balance and a spring would yield the same ordering of two objects' weights in measuring mass (cf. Tversky and Thaler 1990, 203) . Although this is generally assumed in measuring mass, the assumption is not part of any formal theory but rather is established by its empirical reliability: suppose that the spring is so rigid that two objects yield the same result (some length of the spring) while the pan balance shows that the two objects are not equally balanced. Then even in the physical experiment procedure invariance is not guaranteed. For a more realistic example think of a case of cardinal rather than ordinal measurement, e.g., temperature: the expansion rates of mercury and alcohol cannot be assumed to be identical
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prior to empirical investigations. The fact that we nowadays use the two types of thermometer interchangeably is because of the tested reliability of both types in a certain range of temperature (Chang 2004, chap. 2) . Therefore, psychologists' explanation of PR as the violation of procedure invariance is not analogous to economists' modification or abandonment of the axioms of EUT: psychologists' explanatory strategy is not dictated by normative considerations such as the principle of charity. Rather, it is a triangulation strategy led by the reliability of diverse measurement methods. 29 A quote from a methodological textbook of experimental psychology clearly states this point:
[S]ingle measures of complex states such as motivation, neurosis, or learning will be so limited as to produce conclusions of doubtful generality. Another way of saying this is that a single measure of a complex state provides a poor sample. To the extent that it is possible, multiple measures should always be used and compared. Sometimes the inconsistencies of different measures create problems that eventually lead to new insights. (Plutchik 1968, 84) I would add "preference" in the list of "complex states." 30 A classic textbook on measurement makes the same point:
In contrast to fundamental physical measurement, which is typically one-dimensional . . . many of the theories of measurement that appear applicable to behavioral problems are inherently multidimensional, and so the measurement theories deal simultaneously with several measures and the laws connecting them. These theories suggest new qualitative laws to be tested, and even when they are found to be wrong, much may be learned if the violations are systematic. Moreover, these theories lead to selection among the many factors that might be relevant by focusing attention on those variables that enter into simple qualitative laws. (Krantz et al. [1971 (Krantz et al. [ ] 2007 29 Hacking (1983, chap. 13, 14, and 16 ) is the classic work on the reliability of measurement in physics. Trout (1998) develops "measured realism" in the behavioral sciences. Borsboom (2005) provides a comprehensive philosophical analysis of psychometrics, while Michell (1999) gives it a historical perspective. 30 In fact, Plutchnik (1968, 45 ) cites Slovic's (1964) early study as a good illustration of his point.
These authors' presumption that mental states are complex and multidimensional is based on their experience that the reliable measurement of these properties is empirically very difficult to establish; it is not based on a priori considerations. So even if rational choice theory does not seem to give the complete explanation of human behavior, this is because of the empirical features of human psychology, not because of the truth of an a priori claim such as premise 3. How successful a science can be depends on contingent facts such as historical coincidences, researchers' ingenuity, resources spent on research, and ultimately, empirical features of the objects of study.
One might object that Davidson allows for the possibility that the empirical application of a formal theory tells us something about inconsistencies in human behavior by noting (though within brackets) that a formal theory tells us nothing about inconsistencies "as opposed to features of its empirical application." But in Davidson's argument, this crucial point is glossed over by his emphasis that the interpretation of evidence by means of a formal theory is dictated by the principle of charity. As I have argued, however, normative considerations such as the principle of charity constitute one type of heuristics in theory development, and empirical considerations seem to offer some support for the compatibility hypothesis, which was not developed on the basis of normative heuristics. One might also defend Davidson by pointing out that in the step from premise 3 to the conclusion there is an implicit but defensible premise (alluded to in premise 1) that any genuine explanatory theory must be formalized as an axiomatic system. If this is true, then Davidson is arguing that behavioral science fails because it cannot give a formal theory that explains inconsistencies in behavior. However, I do not think that formality is a necessary condition for an explanation to be genuine. Of course, as suggested in premise 1, a formal theory is instrumental in attempting the precise measurement of unobservable properties. But if the reliable measurement of target properties (such as preferences or subjective beliefs) is not achieved empirically, then the experimentalist is justified to modify or abandon the theory, and to propose an explanation, formal or not, of why this failure in measurement obtains.
31 Thus this objection from formality does not save Davidson's argument from being unsound. The upshot is that the 31 If one insists on the necessity of formality in explanation, creative theoreticians are ready to offer him or her a formal theory; Gold and List (2004) give a formal theory (based on the first-order predicate logic) that explains the violation of procedure invariance (and of description invariance) as a result of the path-dependence of an individual's choice among her implicitly mutually inconsistent propositions.
argument from normativity fails, because it is possible to explain why EUT fails without relying on normative heuristics of rationality. To evaluate how successful such a theory is, we need to engage in scientific (i.e., theoretical and empirical) analysis, rather than trying to find out a priori reasons to reject the whole enterprise.
Conclusion
In this article, I have taken seriously the skeptic challenge against the progress of behavioral science and have argued against two prominent arguments, the argument from circularity and the argument from normativity. The results are important for the general discussion on the nature of empirical testing, in particular the test of behavioral theories such as decision theory. I have started from accepting the holistic folk-psychological framework as a foundation of decision theory (section 2). But I have argued that this holistic framework can be tested in a nonviciously circular way, and that such a test can thus confirm and disconfirm the theory (section 3). Furthermore, I have argued that the normative character of decision theory does not prevent experimentalists from developing an explanatory theory while being guided by empirical rather than normative heuristics. More specifically, my central claim has been that what guides experimental psychologists is their trust in the reliability of measurement. Contrast their careful attitude with Davidson's untested commitment to the effect that intentional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, aversions, etc. "don't have objects in any psychological or epistemic sense. The attitudes are simply states, and no more require objects before the mind than sticks require numbers in order to have a certain length" ([1995] 2004, 129) . Although we talk about and refer to beliefs and desires all the time, perhaps more often than we talk about sticks and stones, this fact alone does not guarantee their existence. Carefully defined and measured observations of people's behavior, on the contrary, suggest that beliefs and desires cannot be attributed to decision makers in the precise way presupposed by decision theory. This fact allows one to be critical toward the theory for its limited empirical success, but not for its lack of scientific status. Decision theory can be empirical, and it can be evaluated and improved accordingly.
In defending the so-called "logic of the situation," a version of the rationality principle of "acting adequately to the situation," Popper ([1967 Popper ([ ] 1995 argued that maintaining this principle is a good methodological policy because we learn a lot more from questioning specific models which are hypothesized together with the principle, whereas "[w]e do not learn much in learning that [the rationality principle] is not strictly true: we know this already." But what Popper (and others) did not know at that time is how exactly it is not true. We do know this now, thanks to the progress in economics and psychology, and we have learned a lot in learning this.
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